Where did the term “full-spectrum survivability assessment” originate?
The term comes from Public Law 117-81, Section 223, which was passed in December 2021. In the law, Congress requested the Secretary of Defense to expand the survivability (and lethality) testing of covered military systems to include testing against nonkinetic threats to “enable assessments . . . of the warfighting capabilities of a covered system with respect to communications, firepower, mobility, catastrophic survivability, and lethality.” The law also requested several demonstration programs be chosen to evaluate full-spectrum survivability and lethality and that a report be provided to the congressional defense committees on what was performed, as well as a briefing on changes to the law that would be required to implement full-spectrum survivability and lethality assessment.
What exactly is meant by, and included in, the term?
DoD Instruction 5000.98, “Operational Test and Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation,” and DoD Manual 5000.99, “Realistic Full Spectrum Survivability and Lethality Testing,” refer to the comprehensive testing and assessment of “relevant kinetic and nonkinetic threats,” citing examples such as kinetic; cyber; electromagnetic (EM); directed energy (DE); chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); and artificial intelligence (AI)-based threats. In addition, the required scope of evaluation includes multiple kill types (e.g., communication, firepower, mobility, etc.) against the entire range of operationally representative threats. As much as possible, and where it can be based in validated analysis and M&S tools, evaluations should also include the combined effects of multiple types of attacks.
To whom does the term apply?
Full-spectrum survivability assessment affects the entire survivability community, as well as the many organizations, individuals, and activities that support the community. For example, cyber testing, aircraft signature measurements, chem-bio assessments, EM testing, and other similar efforts all provide relevant data that are important to evaluate a system’s overall survivability. Whether data have been acquired in contractor or developmental testing, operational testing, or formal live fire testing, they have the potential to impact the entire test community. Accordingly, one of the reasons new guidance documents have been developed is to encourage the breaking down of the artificial stovepipes in the community to allow for earlier acquisition of relevant data and the conduct of more efficient test programs among multiple organizations.
How is this assessment the same as current community activities?
It’s important to recognize that full-spectrum survivability assessment as a concept is not new, even if the language has been changed to try and present a more concise and coherent approach to evaluations. Nonkinetic threats have been evaluated on many systems for many years, as this evaluation directly supports testing against operationally representative threats (as described in 10 U.S. Code 4172). Additionally, survivability has always been broader than “live fire.” In fact, while we call it the Live Fire Law, the formal title specifically addresses survivability and lethality testing prior to full-scale production. As is well known, survivability has multiple components—vulnerability, susceptibility, force protection, and recoverability—and has long involved more than just kinetic threats.
What are presently the biggest technical challenges with full-spectrum survivability assessment?
The formalized shift to this type of assessment emphasizes addressing gaps that exist in traditional survivability assessments, such as combined effects testing, data sharing across stovepipes, and digital life-cycle testing.
One of the biggest changes that will need to be addressed is combined effects assessment, which has not historically been performed (or performed as rigorously as needed). The Joint Live Fire (JLF) program has been sponsoring the development of tool frameworks that should be able to help provide the needed tools, but it will take time and data to validate these tools and ensure their accuracy. This paradigm shift will also require the survivability community to integrate testing across disciplines by breaking down traditional stovepipes between domains, such as cyber testing, EM signature analysis, and live fire testing, to enable a cohesive survivability assessment.
In addition, Section 223 of Public Law 117-81 requests the expansion of survivability testing by developing digital technologies to test such systems against threats throughout the life cycle of each such system. Again, this expansion is something of an evolution of the process, as systems have always been able to be placed back on Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight when systems are undergoing upgrades to their warfighting capabilities or are exposed to new threats. How and when this is applied to fielded, aging systems will need to be determined.
What are presently the biggest programmatic challenges with full-spectrum survivability assessment?
The biggest programmatic challenge for the community here is also an opportunity. As much as possible, we need to try and plan ahead for the operationally relevant threat environment at initial operational capability (IOC) +10 years and beyond. The tools that DoDI 5000.98 is asking for—for example, Mission-Based Risk Assessment (MBRA)—are not meant to create a new product for the sake of adding length to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). As it has for many years and programs, the entire community—which includes the programmatic side, the testers, and the Intelligence community—needs to come together and look honestly at the system, how it’s planned to be used, and how it will evolve over time against an evolving threat environment. Recognizing these challenges feeds directly into the test concept, which, when combined with the master schedule, feeds the integrated decision support key. By stepping through the process, it becomes clear what constitutes an adequate test program that addresses the outstanding issues.
Another programmatic challenge is that systems are currently developed and tested individually by program office. To effectively test full-spectrum survivability in multidomain environments, coordination and support across multiple program offices, stakeholders, and Services will need to occur.
What Impact Will Full-Spectrum Survivability Assessment Likely Have on Current Costs and Schedules?
Though some community members might fear a dramatic increase in scope for survivability testing that will ultimately drive up program costs and break schedules, this shouldn’t be the case. Because the concept isn’t new, the same basic requirements that are now in place have been in place previously. DOT&E isn’t going to suddenly expect every system to test for a particular threat just because it exists and is named in Section 223. The threat still needs to be operationally realistic, and survivability testing is not pass/fail. We gather the data to ensure the Services and operators have the best understanding of the capabilities of their system. Where gaps and challenges exist, it’s best to understand them in testing so they can be adequately addressed, whether through materiel solutions or changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures.
About the Author
Dr. Gregory Ruderman currently serves as DOT&E’s Land and Expeditionary Warfare Test and Evaluation Technical Advisor and previously served as a Senior Military Systems Evaluator for Survivability and Lethality for Rotary Wing, Integrated Fires, and Directed Energy systems.
